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Of Butchers, Bakers, and Casket Makers: St. Joseph
Abbey v. Castille and the Fifth Circuit’s Rejection of
Pure Economic Protectionism as a Legitimate State
Interest
INTRODUCTION
Cutting timber, brewing beer, and making wine—the Benedictine
monks strive to maintain a life of simplicity by engaging in various
common trades to financially support their monastic communities.1
Hurricane Katrina forced the monks of St. Joseph Abbey (Abbey) to
find a new trade; the monks could no longer cut and sell timber
since their supply was washed away by the storm.2 As a result,
turning to their century-old tradition of casket making, the Abbey’s
monks began selling their handmade wooden caskets customarily
used to bury their brethren.3 For the monks, the art of casket
making was the clear solution, allowing them to maintain a quiet
lifestyle in furtherance of the order’s motto ora et labora—“prayer
and work”;4 however, in their quest to become more Christ-like,
the monks became monastic-clad criminals. Unbeknownst to the
Abbey, the monks were operating in contravention of Louisiana
law, which requires that all intrastate casket sales to the public be
Copyright 2015, by ALLISON B. KINGSMILL.
1. See Free the Monks and Free Enterprise: Challenging Louisiana’s Casket
Cartel, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/louisiana-caskets-background-2,
archived at http://perma.cc/NLP9-Z6PY (last visited Oct. 5, 2014) (“Selling
caskets helps the monks pay for food and healthcare, and helps them share their
belief in the noble simplicity of life and death.”).
2. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
3. Id. (“In years past, the Abbey’s timberland provided a source of income.
After Hurricane Katrina destroyed its timber, the Abbey began looking for other
revenue sources. For generations the Abbey has made simple wooden caskets to
bury its monks. Public interest in the Abbey’s caskets increased after two
bishops were buried in Abbey caskets in the 1990s. Seeing potential in this
demand, the Abbey invested $200,000 in ‘St. Joseph Woodworks,’ managed by
Mark Coudrain, a deacon of the Church and an employee of the Abbey. The
business plan was simple. St. Joseph Woodworks offered one product—caskets
in two models, ‘monastic’ and ‘traditional,’ priced at $1,500 and $2,000
respectively, significantly lower than those offered by funeral homes.”).
4. Free the Monks and Free Enterprise: Challenging Louisiana’s Casket
Cartel, supra note 1. As a Benedictine Monastery, the monks of St. Joseph
Abbey follow the teachings of Saint Benedict of Nursia, a sixth-century
Christian monk. Id. “This ancient tradition is encapsulated in the Benedictine
motto ‘ora et labora’ (prayer and work). The monastic life at Saint Joseph
Abbey is one of liturgical prayer, the singing of psalms, simple labor, education,
and hospitality toward those seeking a contemplative respite from the world.”
Id.
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made by a state-licensed funeral director at a state-licensed funeral
home.5 The Louisiana Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors
(State Board), the entity responsible for enforcing the relevant
statutes and regulations, caught wind of the rising enterprise and
ordered the monks to shut down their casket-making business or
face heavy fines, jail time, and an injunctive lawsuit.6
In St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, the Abbey sought to enjoin the
State Board from enforcing the casket regulations, contending that
the Louisiana laws violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.7 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana found the casket regulations unconstitutional
on equal protection and due process grounds.8 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.9 The Fifth Circuit held
that mere economic protection of the funeral industry, absent a
connection to the advancement of the public good or general
welfare, is not a legitimate state interest.10 Although the monks
rejoiced in their Fifth Circuit victory, the State Board swiftly
petitioned the United States Supreme Court to overturn the Fifth

5. See LA REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:831(33), (39), § 848 (2011).
6. See id. § 37:848; Castille, 712 F.3d at 217–19.
7. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d,
712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013). The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 151 (holding it “unconstitutional to
require those persons who intend solely to manufacture and sell caskets be subject
to the licensing requirements for funeral directors and funeral establishments”).
The district court found that this requirement was in contravention of the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, because there was no rational
basis for the state to “require persons who seek to enter into the retailing of caskets
to undergo the training and expense necessary to comply with these rules.” Id. at
151. In addition, the court found that “there [was] nothing in the licensing
procedures that bestows any benefit to the public in the context of the retail sale of
caskets,” and “[t]he license [had] no bearing on the manufacturing and sale of
caskets.” Id. at 151. The court believed the “sole reason for these laws [was] the
economic protection of the funeral industry which reason the Court has previously
found not to be a valid government interest standing alone to provide a
constitutionally valid reason for these provisions.” Id.
9. Castille, 712 F.3d at 217.
10. Id. at 226–27.
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Circuit’s ruling.11 However, the Supreme Court rejected the State
Board’s petition.12
By denying the State Board’s writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court remained silent regarding the constitutionality of Louisiana’s
casket laws, and thus the decision holding the law unconstitutional
became final. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has a colorful history
of reviewing economic legislation very similar to Louisiana’s casket
regulations.13 Supreme Court jurisprudence has touched on the
various mechanisms used to protect individuals’ economic liberties,
such as the freedom to pursue a livelihood.14 In the nineteenth
century, many Supreme Court justices considered such economic
liberties to be natural rights.15 Throughout the nineteenth century
until the 1930s, also known as the “Lochner Era,”16 the Court
closely scrutinized economic laws and interpreted the Due Process
Clause as protecting the freedom of contract.17 Consequently,
during that time the Supreme Court invalidated most economic
11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Castille v. St. Joseph Abbey, 134 S. Ct.
423 (2013) (No. 13-91). Members of the State Board filed a petition for
certiorari on July 17, 2013, requesting review of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion. Id.
The Board urged the Court to allow the writ, because there is a circuit split
regarding whether pure economic protectionism is a legitimate governmental
interest under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Id. at 35.
12. Castille v. St. Joseph Abbey, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICES 622 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011) (“The Supreme Court’s
protection of economic liberties has varied enormously over time.”).
15. Id. (“In the early nineteenth century, the Court invoked natural law
principles to protect property rights.”). Justice Chase “expressed the view that
the government could neither violate the provisions of the Constitution nor
infringe rights that are part of the natural law.” Id. at 624. He stated, “there are
certain vital principles in our free Republic governments, which will determine
and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power . . . An ACT of
the legislature . . . contrary to the great first principles of the social compact,
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.” Id. at 625.
16. The era was named after the famous case of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) (finding that a law restricting the number of hours bakers could
work was unconstitutional).
17. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 630. Throughout the “Lochner Era,”
the Supreme Court stated that:
[F]reedom of contract is a basic right protected as liberty and property
rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .
the Court [has] said that liberty includes the right ‘to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential’ to carrying
out a trade or profession.
Id. The Court said that the state could limit the freedom of contract only to serve
a valid police purpose, and it was the judiciary’s responsibility to closely
scrutinize such legislation to make sure it served a valid police purpose. Id. at
630–31.
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legislation as illegitimate interferences with the freedom of
contract.18
However, in the 1930s, the Court changed course and rejected
the protection of freedom of contract as a liberty interest under the
Due Process Clause.19 The Court has not invalidated a single piece
of economic legislation on due process or equal protection grounds
since, opting for a more deferential, rational basis review of state
laws.20 Now, in order to satisfy the outermost limits of due process
and equal protection, economic legislation must be supported by a
legitimate governmental purpose, and the state’s interest must be
rationally related to the regulation.21 Applying these minimal due
process requirements, lower courts now often defer to the judgment of
state legislatures as to the reasonableness of legislation.22 Yet, the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses maintain necessary
safeguards for economic liberties.23 Despite states’ possible
protectionist motivations, courts scrutinize economic laws to find
some discernible connection to a legitimate state interest, such as
protecting public health or safety.24
Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in St. Joseph Abbey v.
Castille, the Tenth Circuit applied the rational basis standard of
review and upheld a state regulatory scheme that was strikingly
similar to the Louisiana regulations restricting the sale of caskets.25
18. Id. at 632 (“[T]he Court followed the principles articulated in Lochner,
finding many laws unconstitutional as interfering with freedom of contract. It is
estimated that almost 200 state laws were declared unconstitutional as violating
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
19. Id. at 639–40.
20. Id. at 641. “The legal inquiry using the rational basis test is two-fold.
The Court must determine (1) whether the regulation has a legitimate
government purpose; and (2) whether there is a rational relationship between
that purpose and the means chosen by the State to accomplish it.” St. Joseph
Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149, 156 (E.D. La. 2011).
21. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 156.
22. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 642. The Supreme Court stressed the
need for judicial deference to legislative choices in an opinion upholding a state
economic regulation. The Court found that it is for the legislatures, not the
courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
23. Although the Supreme Court has adopted a policy of great deference to
state economic regulations, legislation must still meet the requirements of the
rational review standard. See supra note 20.
24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 641 (“The government’s purpose can
be any goal not prohibited by the Constitution.”).
25. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act did not violate the Due Process
Clause or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Like the
Louisiana statutes, the Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act requires that
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The Tenth Circuit was satisfied with the state’s sole interest in
protecting the funeral industry.26 As a result, a circuit split emerged
with the Sixth Circuit, which previously invalidated a nearly
identical casket regulation on equal protection and due process
grounds.27 Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit explicitly
rejected economic protectionism as a legitimate rationale for
funeral director licensure requirements.28
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille
comes at a seismic moment. In light of the circuit split, the Fifth
Circuit’s decision demonstrates that neither precedent nor
constitutional principles protect pure economic protectionism as a
legitimate state interest.29 More importantly, however, the Fifth
Circuit breathed life back into rational basis review, a test
commonly misperceived as a “virtual rubber stamp” and “judicial
abdication.”30 This Note proposes that courts should look to the
Fifth Circuit as a revival of the rational basis standard of review in
the due process and equal protection contexts rather than a rebirth
of Lochnerian principles and judicial activism. Part I of this Note
explains the constitutional principles underlying the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and
traces the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the
context of economic legislation. Part II examines the circuit split
between the Sixth and Tenth Circuits on the issue of whether pure
economic protectionism is a legitimate government purpose. Part
III then discusses the Fifth Circuit’s decision in St. Joseph Abbey v.
Castille. Part IV analyzes the reasoning of the opinion, and Part V
considers the implications of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling and its
effects on future economic legislation, particularly in Louisiana.

any person engaged in the sale of caskets be a licensed funeral director operating
out of a funeral establishment. Id. at 1212.
26. See id. at 1222–23 (holding that “the FSLA need only be rationally related
to the legitimate state interest of intrastate industry protection. There can be no
serious dispute that the FSLA is ‘very well tailored’ to protecting the intrastate
funeral-home industry”).
27. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act’s prohibition on sale of caskets
by anyone not licensed as a funeral director violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
28. Id. at 224 (“Courts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete
interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental
purpose.”).
29. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
30. Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the
Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 607 (2000).
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I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ECONOMIC LEGISLATION
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”31 The term “due process of
law” originated in England to “secure the subject against the arbitrary
action of the crown.”32 The due process requirement has a similar
effect on the legislatures, both federal and state, in the United States.33
Initially, the Due Process Clause was interpreted merely as a
procedural limitation, requiring states to provide fair procedures
before depriving individuals of certain interests.34 Eventually,
however, the Due Process Clause developed a substantive
component. The doctrine of substantive due process protects persons
against arbitrary state laws that exceed the limits of the government’s
authority.35
A. The Birth of Substantive Due Process
Shortly after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court rejected an attempt to use the Due Process Clause
to protect economic liberties from governmental interference.36
The Slaughter-House Cases involved a challenge to a Louisiana
law that granted a private company a 25-year monopoly in the
livestock landing and slaughterhouse business and required
persons to pay a fixed fee for using the facilities to slaughter
animals.37 Several butchers attacked the constitutionality of the law
as a violation of due process and a deprivation of their rights to
pursue a livelihood.38 The butchers’ argument formulated the
doctrine now known as “substantive due process” and provided
that the Due Process Clause protects certain fundamental rights
from government limitations, including the right to choose a
profession.39 However, the majority rejected the butchers’ claims.40
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
32. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519 (1885).
33. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of
Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16
U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 313 (1991) (“The touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” (quoting
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889))).
34. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 626.
35. Levinson, supra note 33, at 314 n.7.
36. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80–81 (1872).
37. Id. at 59–61.
38. Id. at 43.
39. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 626.
40. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 82.
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Refusing to inject substance into the Due Process Clause, the
Supreme Court declared:
[U]nder no construction of that provision that we have ever
seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint
imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their
trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a
deprivation of property within the meaning of that
provision.41
Although the majority was adamant in its rejection of
substantive due process doctrine, Justice Bradley countered it with
a powerful dissent interpreting the Due Process Clause as a
mechanism to prevent states from adopting arbitrary laws.42 Justice
Bradley interpreted the words “liberty” and “property” in the Due
Process Clause as protecting the right to practice a trade,
occupation, or profession.43 He believed that a statute prohibiting
citizens from pursuing a lawful employment deprived citizens of
both liberty and property without due process of law.44 Justice
Bradley’s dissent espoused principles of natural law, a philosophy
embraced by many of the Framers of the Constitution, and set the
stage for a new era of jurisprudence where the Supreme Court
would rigorously review the substance of state economic
regulations.45
In Munn v. Illinois, the Railroad Commission Cases, and Mugler
v. Kansas, the Supreme Court upheld various economic regulations
yet maintained Bradley-like beliefs in natural rights.46 Although the
Court validated the constitutionality of the laws, the Court also
recognized due process restraints on the government’s regulatory
power.47 In Munn, the Court upheld a state law that set maximum rates
for grain-storage warehouses; however, the Court simultaneously
suggested that a state regulation may be invalidated as a violation of
due process “[i]f no state of circumstances could exist to justify such
a statute.”48 Thereafter, in the Railroad Commission Cases, the
41. Id. at 81.
42. See id. at 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (arguing that “a law which
prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment, or from
following a lawful employment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty
as well as property, without due process of law”).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 627.
46. Id. at 628–29.
47. See id. at 628.
48. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132–33 (1877) (“If no state of circumstances
could exist to justify such a statute, then we may declare this one void, because
is excess of the legislative power of the State. But if it could, we must presume it
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Court sustained a state law regulating railroad rates but alluded to
the potential fatality of such laws under the Due Process Clause,
warning that the “power to regulate is not a power to destroy.”49
Finally, in Mugler v. Kansas, the Court upheld a state ban on
alcoholic beverages but indicated that legislation is valid only if it
truly serves a valid state police purpose.50 The Court said:
If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to
protect the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or
is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law, it is the duty of the courts so to adjudge, and thereby
give effect to the Constitution.51
Justice Bradley’s dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases, and the
Supreme Court’s majority opinions in Munn v. Illinois, the Railroad
Commission Cases, and Mugler v. Kansas, articulated the Supreme
Court’s evolving interpretation of the Due Process Clause as not
only a bundle of procedural limitations, but also a limitation upon
the substantive power of state legislatures to regulate various areas
of economic life.52 These cases set the stage for the “Lochner era,” a
period known for the Supreme Court’s suspicions of state regulations
and the inevitable fatality of most economic legislation.53
B. The Lochner Era
Lochner v. New York ushered in a regime characterized by the
widespread invalidation of state economic regulations on substantive

did. Of the propriety of legislative interference within the scope of legislative
power, the legislature is the exclusive judge.”).
49. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886).
50. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). A Kansas law prohibited
the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor. Id. at 657. Mugler was arrested
for making and selling beer. The Court found that the Kansas prohibition did not
infringe on Fourteenth Amendment rights, because it falls within the state’s
police powers. Id. at 661–63.
51. Id. at 661.
52. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 627–29.
53. Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991) (“Legal scholars and
historians have generally depicted the Lochner era as a deviant period during
which the Supreme Court broke from the constitutionalism that the Marshall Court
established and the New Deal Court restored. They maintain that the Lochner era
Court, which struck down much legislation affecting industrial regulation, strayed
from the American constitutional tradition by underconstruing the scope of
congressional power and overprotecting private property.”).
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due process grounds.54 Lochner gave hope to the butchers whose
challenges were rejected in the Slaughter-House Cases and defined a
new formulation of due process analysis.55 Accepting freedom of
contract as a fundamental right, the Supreme Court carefully
scrutinized laws to ensure that those laws were supported by valid
governmental objectives and that the regulations sufficiently achieved
those objectives.56
In Lochner, the Court struck down a New York law limiting
the hours that a bakery employee could work as an undue
interference with the bakers’ liberty of contract, a fundamental
right protected by the guarantees of the Due Process Clause.57 The
Supreme Court found that the government could only interfere with
the freedom of contract to serve a valid police purpose, and it was
the judiciary’s responsibility to closely scrutinize such legislation to
ensure that it did.58 In examining the legislation, the Court asked
whether the regulation was a “fair, reasonable and appropriate
exercise of the police power of the State” or, rather, “an
unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right
of the individual to his personal liberty.”59 The Court demanded
such scrutiny of economic legislation, recognizing that many laws
purporting to protect the public health or welfare were nothing more
than self-serving economic measures to protect private interests.60
Rejecting the government’s supposed goals of public health and
safety, the Court refused to defer to the legislature’s findings of
fact.61 Rather, the Court suspected that the state’s sole motive was to
regulate labor conditions.62 Moreover, the Court determined that
the goal of protecting bakers’ health could be satisfied by less
restrictive measures, such as inspecting premises and requiring that
wash rooms be furnished.63
In contrast, Justice Harlan’s dissent found the state law
constitutional and criticized the majority for failing to defer to the
54. See id. at 8, 14.
55. See id. at 92–93.
56. Id. at 16.
57. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
58. Id. at 68.
59. Id. at 56.
60. Id. at 64 (“It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many
of the laws of this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the police
power for the purpose of protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality,
passed from other motives.”).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 62–63 (“In our judgment it is not possible in fact to discover
the connection between the number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and
the healthful quality of the bread made by the workman.”).
63. Id. at 61.
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legislature.64 Deferring to the legislature’s findings, Justice Harlan
accepted the maximum-hour regulation as a reasonable means to
protect the health of bakers who were frequently exposed to flour
dust and intense heat.65 In an equally vigorous dissent, Justice
Holmes criticized the majority’s judicial activism, warning that “a
Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory.”66 Justice Holmes concluded that “liberty” in terms of due
process should be found only to have been violated when “a
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”67
C. The Decline of Economic Substantive Due Process
The reign of Lochner ended with the Court’s decision in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, which flatly rejected freedom of contract
as a fundamental right.68 The Supreme Court instead found that the
government could regulate to serve a legitimate purpose, and the
judiciary would defer to the legislature’s decision as long as it was
reasonable.69 With the death of the freedom-of-contract doctrine in
this context, the Due Process Clause survives to preserve and protect
economic liberties. In a post-Lochner decision, the Supreme Court
articulated that the “liberty component of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes some generalized due
process right to choose one’s field of private employment, but a
right which is nevertheless subject to reasonable government
regulation.”70 Thus, freedom of contract is no longer protected as a
fundamental right; economic liberties are still rights protected under
the “liberty” provision of the Due Process Clause, but they are

64. See id. at 76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 69–70.
66. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 76.
68. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state
minimum wage law for women, finding a reasonable state interest in protecting
the health of women and redressing women’s inferior bargaining power).
What is this freedom [of contract]? The Constitution does not speak of
freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. . . . [R]egulation which is
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process.
Id. at 391.
69. See id. at 393.
70. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999).
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subjected to a lesser degree of scrutiny than those that are
fundamental.71
After the Supreme Court abandoned freedom of contract as a
fundamental right, it swept away the remnants of Lochner in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.72 The Court in Carolene Products
formulated a more deferential, less-stringent procedure for analyzing
economic regulations, yet maintained a threshold requirement of
rationality.73 Emphasizing a need for deference to legislative
choices, the Court applied a presumption of constitutionality and a
minimum-rationality standard to legislation.74 The Court firmly
declared that economic regulations should be upheld as long as there
was some rational basis, and “any state of facts either known or
which could reasonably be assumed” would be considered in
support thereof.75
In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., the Supreme Court upheld the
rational basis framework set forth in Carolene Products but relaxed
judicial scrutiny of economic legislation even further.76 The Court
upheld an Oklahoma statute that made it unlawful for any person not
a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit eyeglass lenses into
frames without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or
optometrist.77 Encouraging judicial deference to legislative findings,
the Court concluded that “the Oklahoma law may exact a needless,
wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the legislature, not
the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new
requirement.”78 Applying the rational basis test, the Court
hypothesized justifications that the legislature may have considered
to support the regulation.79 The Oklahoma law was more likely a
71. Id.
72. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (sustaining a
federal prohibition on the interstate shipment of “filled” milk as a constitutional
exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce).
[T]he existence of facts supporting the [statute prohibiting the shipment
of filled milk in interstate commerce] is to be presumed, for regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators.
Id. at 152.
73. Id. at 147–48.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 154.
76. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
77. See id. at 485.
78. Id. at 487.
79. Id.
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protectionist measure to maintain the business of optometrists and
ophthalmologists rather than a desire to improve health; however,
the Court found that the hypothetical justifications of public health
satisfied the requirement of rationality.80
In response to an era marked by the Court’s aggressive review
of economic legislation, Carolene Products formulated a rational
basis test for judicial review of economic legislation under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.81 The Supreme Court has
since expressed numerous definitions and articulations of the
rational basis requirement, giving rise to confusion surrounding its
application in the context of economic legislation.82
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Despite the challenged regulations’ striking resemblance in both
cases, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits reached opposite conclusions
regarding the constitutionality of legislation granting the exclusive
right to sell caskets to funeral directors.83 The Sixth Circuit in
Craigmiles v. Giles refused to accept the mere assertion of a
legitimate government interest and determined that the licensing
requirement was “nothing more than an attempt to prevent

Id.

The legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions
when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regulation
of the fitting of eyeglasses. Likewise, when it is necessary to duplicate
a lens, a written prescription may or may not be necessary. But the
legislature might have concluded that one was needed often enough to
require one in every case. Or the legislature may have concluded that
eye examinations were so critical, not only for correction of vision but
also for detection of latent ailments or diseases, that every change in
frames and every duplication of a lens should be accompanied by a
prescription from a medical expert.

80. Id. at 487–88 (explaining that a “law need not be in every respect
logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it”).
81. See supra text accompanying note 69.
82. See Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results,
84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 808 (2006) (“[O]ne of the largest problems with the
[rational basis] test is the Court’s inconsistency in applying it. . . . [T]here are
actually two levels of rational basis review: good old-fashioned, deferential
rational basis review and a more demanding, heightened version—one with
‘teeth.’”).
83. See infra notes 84–85.
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economic competition.”84 Dissimilarly, the Tenth Circuit in
Powers v. Harris swiftly accepted pure economic protectionism of
the funeral industry as a legitimate state interest and upheld the
casket regulations.85
A. The Sixth Circuit: Craigmiles v. Giles
Applying the rational basis framework set forth in Carolene
Products, the Sixth Circuit invalidated a regulation limiting the
retail sale of caskets to licensed funeral directors on equal
protection and due process grounds and explicitly rejected
economic favoritism as a legitimate rationale for the state licensure
requirements.86 Under the rational basis standard of review, the
key issue was whether the state had a rational basis for
implementing the regulation.87 The state claimed that the licensure
requirement promoted public health and safety and consumer
protection.88
Although public health and consumer protection are legitimate
state interests, the court examined the evidence set forth in the
record to evaluate the relationship between the law and the state’s
purpose.89 Analyzing the public safety objective, the court
emphasized the following facts: the state did not require the use of
caskets in burials; there were no special requirements regarding the
construction of caskets sold by funeral directors to distinguish
them from caskets sold elsewhere; and none of the training
received by funeral directors regarding caskets had anything to do
with public health or safety.90 Turning to the consumer protection
justification, the court found no evidence that consumers were
treated any differently by funeral directors compared to other
casket retailers.91 Considering the fact that caskets are usually the
most expensive purchase in a funeral arrangement, the court found
that the regulations actually hurt the consumer by reducing price
competition and therefore simultaneously increasing casket prices.92
84. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225, 228 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Finding
no rational relationship to any of the articulated purposes of the state, we are left
with the more obvious illegitimate purpose to which licensure provision is very
well tailored. The licensure requirement imposes a significant barrier to
competition in the casket market.”).
85. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
86. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 225.
89. See id. at 224–26.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 225–26.
92. See id. at 226.
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Considering the evidence directly contradicting the state’s
reasoning of public health and safety and consumer protection, the
court was unable to find a rational relation between the regulatory
scheme and any legitimate state interest.93 The Sixth Circuit thus
concluded that the attenuated rationalizations offered by the state
came “close to striking us with ‘the force of a five-week-old,
unrefrigerated dead fish.’”94 Any conceivable legitimate state
objective was repudiated by the very facts of the case, which the
court could not ignore even under the most forgiving standards of
the rational basis standard of review.95
B. The Tenth Circuit: Powers v. Harris
Two years after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Craigmiles v.
Giles, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Powers v. Harris created a
circuit split.96 Refusing to follow the Sixth Circuit’s holding, the
Tenth Circuit upheld Oklahoma’s regulatory scheme restricting the
retail sale of caskets to licensed funeral directors.97 The court held
that “absent a violation of a specific constitutional provision or
other federal law, intrastate economic protectionism constitutes a
legitimate state interest.”98 Upon finding a rational relationship
between the casket regulation and the funeral directors’ interest in
protecting the intrastate funeral home industry, the court ended its
inquiry.99 The court cited to Supreme Court precedent to justify its
reliance on economic protectionism—the protection of a particular
group or industry from competition—as a valid purpose under
rational basis analysis.100 In the concurring opinion, however,
Judge Tymkovich rejected the majority’s view that pure economic
protectionism is a legitimate state interest.101 Rather, Judge

93. See id. at 225–29.
94. Id. at 225 (citation omitted).
95. See id. at 229 (“No sophisticated economic analysis is required to see
the pretextual nature of the state’s proffered explanations for the [regulation].”).
96. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).
97. See id. at 1211 (“The Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act,
(‘FSLA’), and Board rules promulgated pursuant to the FSLA provide the
regulatory scheme for the funeral industry in Oklahoma. Pursuant to the FSLA,
any person engaged in the sale of funeral-service merchandise, including
caskets, must be a licensed funeral director operating out of a funeral
establishment.” (citations omitted)).
98. Id. at 1221.
99. See id. at 1222.
100. Id. at 1220–21.
101. See id. at 1225–27 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“I write separately
because I believe the majority overstates the application of ‘intrastate economic
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Tymkovich concurred in the holding because he found that the
licensing scheme furthered a state interest in consumer protection.102
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT CASE: ST. JOSEPH ABBEY V. CASTILLE
After the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Powers, the Fifth Circuit
had an opportunity to choose a side in the circuit split discussed
above in St. Joseph Abbey.103 St. Joseph Abbey involved a state
casket regulation limiting the retail sales of caskets to state
licensed funeral directors, which was strikingly similar to the
regulatory schemes in Craigmiles and Powers.
A. Factual and Procedural History
In a search for an alternate source of revenue to support St.
Joseph Abbey’s monastic community in Louisiana, the Abbey’s
monks started “St. Joseph Woodworks,” which sold the Abbey’s
traditional handmade caskets to the public at prices significantly
lower than the prices of caskets sold by funeral homes.104 The
monks did not realize that their small-scale, casket-making
business was operating in violation of a Louisiana law until the
State Board demanded that the monks stop selling their caskets.105
The law at issue, the Louisiana Embalming and Funeral Directors
Act, is a series of statutes and regulations enforced by the State
Board that limits the intrastate sales of caskets to the public to statelicensed funeral directors at state-licensed funeral homes.106 The
regulatory scheme has two major components.107 First, a potential
casket retailer must become a licensed funeral establishment.108 The
licensure requirement of a funeral establishment requires building a
layout parlor for third parties, a display room for six caskets, an
arrangement room, and embalming facilities.109 Second, the funeral

protectionism’ as a legitimate state interest furthered by Oklahoma’s funeral
licensing scheme.”).
102. Id. at 1226–27.
103. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
104. See supra note 3.
105. See Castille, 712 F.3d at 217–18.
106. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:831–37:854 (2011).
107. Id.
108. Id. §§ 37:831(37), (39), 842(D).
109. Castille, 712 F.3d at 218. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:842(D)(3)
(2011).
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establishment must employ a full-time funeral director.110 In order
to become a funeral director, an individual must have a high school
diploma or GED, earn 30 credit hours at an accredited college, and
pass a test administered by the International Conference of Funeral
Examining Boards.111
St. Joseph Abbey sued members of the State Board, seeking
“declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of
Louisiana’s Embalming and Funeral Directors Act . . . asserting
that the statute denied them the right to make and retail caskets to
the Louisiana public.”112 The district court held that the Act’s rules
and regulations granting the exclusive right to sell caskets to
funeral directors were unconstitutional as a denial of equal
protection and due process of law.113 The State Board appealed the
district court’s decision.114
B. Opinion of the Fifth Circuit
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit ruled on the constitutionality of the
Act and affirmed the lower district court decision invalidating the
regulation.115 First, the court expressly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s
holding in Powers v. Harris that pure economic protectionism is a
legitimate government purpose.116 Second, the court reviewed and
ultimately rejected Louisiana’s proffered justifications of public
health and safety and consumer protectionism in light of the Act’s
history and structure.117 Finally, the court did not propose any
hypothetical justifications and was unable to find a rational basis
for the Act.118
1. Pure Economic Protectionism Is Not a Legitimate
Government Interest
The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s holding
in Powers v. Harris that pure economic protectionism of a discrete
110. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:842(D)(1) (2011).
111. Castille, 712 F.3d at 218. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:842(A) (2011).
112. Original Brief of Appellants at 4, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F.
Supp. 2d 149 (E.D. La. 2011) (No. 11-30756), aff’d, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir.
2013).
113. Castille, 835 F. Supp. at 160.
114. Castille, 712 F.3d at 217.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 222–23.
117. Id. at 224–26.
118. Id. at 223 (reasoning that “a hypothetical rationale, even post hoc,
cannot be fantasy, and that the State Board’s chosen means must rationally
relate to the state interests it articulates”).
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industry is a legitimate state interest.119 In support, the court
referenced Powers’ concurring opinion and the Sixth Circuit’s
holding in Craigmiles v. Giles.120 In Powers’ concurring opinion,
Judge Tymkovich rejected pure economic protectionism as a valid
governmental interest but was persuaded that the state had otherwise
identified a sufficient public purpose.121 The Fifth Circuit also
highlighted the Sixth Circuit’s similar rejection of pure economic
protectionism as a rational basis for casket regulations.122 Next, the
court carefully examined Powers’ majority opinion, which stated
that “the Supreme Court has consistently held that protecting or
favoring one particular intrastate industry, absent a specific federal
constitutional or statutory violation, is a legitimate state interest.”123
The court rejected Powers’ contentions as an erroneous application
of Supreme Court precedent.124 According to the Fifth Circuit, the
correct observation of the Court’s precedent is that economic
protectionism “is not an illegitimate interest when protection of the
industry can be linked to advancement of the public interest or
general welfare.”125 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged cases where
the state regulations at issue may have been partly motivated by
economic protectionism; however, the court reasoned that in those
cases the regulations advanced some public purpose connected to
the state’s protectionist motivations.126
2. No Rational Relationship Between the Means and the End
Second, the Fifth Circuit reviewed and rejected the state’s
rationalization of public health and safety and consumer
protectionism in light of the Act’s history and setting.127 The court
followed Williamson’s application of the rational basis test, which
instructs courts to consider post hoc rationales to find a rational
basis for a challenged law.128 Recognizing the deference afforded
119. Id. at 222–23.
120. Id. at 222.
121. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tymkovich, J.,
concurring).
122. Castille, 712 F.3d at 222.
123. Id. at 222 (quoting Powers, 379 F. 3d at 1220).
124. Id. at 222.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 223. The Fifth Circuit previously upheld a Houston taxicab
scheme that disfavored small cab companies, finding that “even if Houston had
been ‘motivated in part by economic protectionism, there is no real dispute that
promoting full-service taxi operations is a legitimate government purpose under
the rational basis test.’” Id.
127. See id. at 223–26.
128. Id. at 223.
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under Williamson, the court stressed that “a hypothetical rationale,
even post hoc, cannot be fantasy, and that the State Board’s chosen
means must rationally relate to the state interests it articulates.”129
The court rejected the state’s consumer protection rationale,
relying on two important facts: (1) “whatever special expertise a
funeral director may have in casket selection is irrelevant to it
being the sole seller of caskets”;130 and (2) “Louisiana’s Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law already polices
inappropriate sales tactics by all sellers of caskets.”131
After examining the Act itself, the court highlighted the only
limitation governing the sale of caskets: the exclusive grant of
intrastate casket sales to funeral directors.132 Just like the law in
Craigmiles v. Giles, Louisiana law does not require a person to be
buried in a casket; restrict intrastate casket purchases from out of
state retailers; or enforce any requirements on intrastate casket
retailers regarding casket size, design, material, or price.133 The
court also reviewed the state’s purported goal of consumer
protection in connection with existing Louisiana law, specifically
Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
law.134 The court found that the law already adequately regulates
unfair trade practices in casket sales, thereby protecting consumers
against fraud and deception.135 Because Louisiana law lacks any
requirements regarding the construction and design of caskets, the
special expertise of casket retailers, and the prerequisite imposing
the use of caskets for burial, the Fifth Circuit similarly rejected the
state’s proffered justification of consumer protection.136

129. Id.
130. Id. at 224.
131. Id. at 225.
132. Id. at 223 (“No provision mandates licensure requirements for casket
retailers or insists that a casket retailer employ someone trained in the business
of funeral direction. Rather, the licensure requirements and other restrictions
imposed on prospective casket retailers create funeral industry control over
intrastate casket sales.”).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 225 (“Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law declares that ‘[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are . . . unlawful’ and empowers
the state attorney general to make ‘rules and regulations’ to interpret the
provisions of the Chapter.”).
135. Id. at 224.
136. See id. at 223–25.
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3. No Conceivable Post Hoc Rationales
Third, the court did not propose any hypothetical justifications
for the licensure requirements, because it could not ascertain any
conceivable rational basis for the Act not articulated by the State
Board.137 The court indicated “although rational basis review
places no affirmative evidentiary burden on the government,
plaintiffs may nonetheless negate a seemingly plausible basis for
the law by adducing evidence of irrationality.”138 As a result, the
court could not find a rational relationship between the Act and
consumer protectionism or public health and safety, because the
state’s plausible rationales were “betrayed by the undisputed facts”
set forth by the Abbey.139
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
From the butchers and bakers, to the casket makers, the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille is a constitutional
landmark for a country that has struggled to find the proper
balance between government regulations and economic liberties.140
The Fifth Circuit’s holding influences the course of future
economic legislation, particularly in Louisiana, and questions the
validity of laws and regulations already in place.141 The Fifth
Circuit’s decision may face a crowd of critics fearing a return to
Lochner-ism and the emergence of a “second order” rational basis
review;142 however, the court’s decision is consistent with
Supreme Court precedent and the very constitutional principles
that influenced the Framers of the Constitution. From the
unforgiving scrutiny of Lochner to the utmost deference of
Williamson, the Court has consistently required a minimum
standard of rationality in determining the constitutionality of
economic legislation.143 The Supreme Court’s precedent equally
137. Id. at 223.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See supra Part I.A–C.
141. See Saint Joseph Abbey, et al. v. Castille, et al. Challenging Louisiana’s
Casket Cartel, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/saint-joseph-abbey-et-al-vcastille-et-al, archived at http://perma.cc/R3ZY-43CV (last visited Oct. 5, 2014)
[hereinafter Challenging Louisiana’s Casket Cartel].
142. Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational
Basis Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065 (2013). The “second order” rational basis test
requires “a more searching inquiry” than is characteristic of the traditional
rational basis test and “involves a more demanding inquiry into the means and
ends of a challenged statute.” Id. at 1067, 1072.
143. Castille, 712 F.3d at 223.

952

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

reveals the Court’s unwavering suspicion of protectionist laws and
its concern for safeguarding economic liberties.144 Amidst the
Supreme Court’s numerous formulations of rational basis review,
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion revitalizes the rationality standard by
adding critical language to the framework established in Carolene
Products and Williamson.145 All courts should follow the Fifth
Circuit’s model analysis of due process and equal protection
claims so that aspiring businesspersons can pursue an honest living
free from arbitrary governmental interference.
A. Return to Constitutional Principles and Precedent
1. The Fifth Circuit Held that Pure Economic Protectionism Is
Not a Legitimate Governmental Interest
The Fifth Circuit rejected the Tenth Circuit’s proposition that
pure economic protectionism of a particular industry is a legitimate
state interest.146 According to Supreme Court precedent,
“protecting or favoring a particular intrastate industry is not an
illegitimate interest when protection of the industry can be linked
to advancement of the public interest or general welfare.”147 At the
heart of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause is
a fear of the government’s arbitrary interference with economic
liberties.148 As the Abbey’s attorney observed:
[T]he very formulation of the rational basis test—a rational
relationship with a legitimate government interest—precludes
a government interest that is nothing more than private
favoritism. To be “equally protected” by the laws necessarily
means that the government will not arbitrarily extend special
favors to one group to the detriment of another.149
The attorney’s observation reflects Justice Field’s pre-Lochner
vision of due process: “The great purpose of the requirement is to
exclude everything that is arbitrary and capricious in legislation
affecting the rights of the citizen.”150
144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14.
145. See supra Part I.C.
146. Castille, 712 F.3d at 222–23.
147. Id. at 222.
148. Id. at 222, 227.
149. Brief of Respondents–Appellees at 19, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712
F.3d 215 (5th Cir.) (No. 11-30756), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
150. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1888) (upholding a state law
which required physicians to hold a degree from a reputable medical college,
pass an examination, or prove practice in West Virginia for the previous ten
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Returning to the spirit of natural law philosophers like Justice
Field, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion demonstrates a concern for
protecting economic liberties, not a return to the Lochner era.151 The
Lochner regime’s aggressive review of economic legislation was a
result of the fundamental right status given to the freedom of
contract.152 The Supreme Court abandoned such scrutiny of state
regulations and the freedom-of-contract theory for a deferential
analysis of legislative choices.153 Nevertheless, the Court purposefully
preserved measures to protect individuals from arbitrary
governmental interference. The Fifth Circuit noted that none of the
Supreme Court cases accepted the contention that protecting or
favoring one particular intrastate industry, absent a specific federal
constitutional or statutory violation, is a legitimate state interest.154
The Supreme Court consistently reiterates notions that “[s]tates are
accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies,”
“the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature,”155 and “[s]tates ‘have
[the] power to legislate against what are found to be injurious
practices in their internal commercial and business affairs.’”156
However, the Supreme Court has similarly reiterated that the rational
basis requirement is meant to protect individuals’ economic liberty
from arbitrary governmental interference and check the legislature
within the confines of its Article III discretion.157
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that economic protectionism is not
a legitimate state interest standing alone but may be validated by a
post hoc perceived rationale.158 In Williamson, “the coloration of
wealth transfer to ophthalmologists and optometrists” was balanced
by the post hoc rationale of public health.159 Similarly, in City of
New Orleans v. Dukes, the Supreme Court concluded that the state

years). The Court noted that each citizen had a right to follow any lawful
calling—subject to natural restraints such as age or sex—as well as state
restrictions, as long as those state restrictions were reasonable. Id. at 121.
151. Castille, 712 F.3d at 227 (“Nor is the ghost of Lochner lurking about.
We deploy no economic theory of social statics or draw upon a judicial vision of
free enterprise.”).
152. See supra Part I.C.
153. See supra Part I.C.
154. Castille, 712 F.3d at 223–24.
155. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
156. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (holding that a Kansas
statute that outlawed a person from engaging in debt adjusting did not violate
the Due Process Clause because it is up to the legislatures, not the courts, to
decide the wisdom and utility of the legislation).
157. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 622.
158. Castille, 712 F.3d at 222–23.
159. Id. at 221 (describing the reasoning of the opinion in Williamson).
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regulation was “a means to preserve the appearance and custom
valued by the Quarter’s residents and attractive to tourists.”160 In
Williamson and Dukes, the challenged regulations effectively
shielded a particular industry or group from economic competition;
however, despite likely protectionist interests, the Supreme Court
found that the state was furthering other legitimate state interests in
both instances.161
Other circuits confirm that naked economic preferences are
impermissible to the extent that they harm consumers.162 The Ninth
Circuit in Merrifield v. Lockyer emphasized that protectionism
might be allowed if coupled with a legitimate state interest:
[T]here might be instances when economic protectionism
might be related to a legitimate governmental interest and
survive rational basis review.163 However, economic
protectionism for its own sake, regardless of its relation to
the common good, cannot be said to be in furtherance of a
legitimate governmental interest.164
Because the Merrifield occupational licensing regulation was solely
advancing the illegitimate interest of pure economic protectionism,
the Ninth Circuit held that it was unconstitutional.165
With the rise and fall of economic substantive due process,
there is a theme embraced by the natural law philosophers, the
Lochner era’s judicial activists, and the Williamson deferentialists,
and it survives today. At a minimum, the Court has consistently
held economic legislation to a standard of rationality.166 If pure
economic protectionism were a legitimate governmental objective,
the rational basis requirement would be depleted and the outer
most limits of due process and equal protection diminished.167 The
160. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 304 (internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding a
New Orleans ordinance banning all pushcart vendors in the French Quarter
except those who had continuously operated there for eight or more years).
161. In other words, both regulations furthered some governmental purpose
despite the states’ likely protectionist motivations for the laws. See supra notes
154–55 and accompanying text.
162. Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 990 (9th Cir. 2008) (invalidating a
state licensing scheme requiring all persons engaged in structural pest control to
obtain licenses).
163. Id. at 991 n.15.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 989 (“[T]he singling out of a particular economic group, with no
rational or logical reason for doing so, was strong evidence of an economic
animus with no relation to public health, morals or safety.”).
166. See supra Part I.C.
167. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
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power to regulate would be limitless. The purpose of government
power is to advance public interests.168 The Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection and due process guarantees are constitutional
checks on the legislature to ensure legitimate state objectives and
prevent irrational governmental interference.169 If public power can
be used to protect purely private interests, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s limitations on states’ powers are meaningless. As a
result, the Fifth Circuit rejected both Louisiana’s regulation and the
Tenth Circuit’s ruling that economic protectionism is a legitimate
state interest.170
2. The Fifth Circuit Found that No Rational Relationship Exists
Between the Casket Regulations and Louisiana’s Interest in
Consumer Protection, Public Health, and Public Safety
The Fifth Circuit found no rational relationship between the
casket regulations and a legitimate governmental objective because
there was none.171 Under Williamson, state legislation will be
upheld against constitutional attack as long as there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the challenged law;172 however, the Fifth Circuit opinion
indicated that the court’s “analysis does not proceed with
abstraction for hypothesized ends and means do not include post
hoc hypothesized facts.”173 The Fifth Circuit echoed Carolene
Products, which declared that legislation is “not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or
generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”174 The burden is on
one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the
legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.175
Plaintiffs challenging state economic regulations appear to
carry a heavy burden; however, the monks carried a relatively
painless burden, because the evidence negated any logical support
for the casket regulations.176 The undisputed facts destroyed any
168. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 625.
169. Id.
170. Castille, 712 F.3d at 227.
171. Id.
172. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
173. Castille, 712 F.3d at 223.
174. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
175. Turner v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
176. Castille, 712 F.3d at 223 (“[P]laintiffs may nonetheless negate a
seemingly plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence of irrationality.”).
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rational relationship between Louisiana’s law and a legitimate
governmental interest: Louisiana consumers can purchase caskets
from any retailer in the United States except non-licensed retailers
in Louisiana.177 In Louisiana, one can buy a casket online from an
inexperienced, uneducated casket maker but cannot purchase a
hand-crafted casket from the monks of St. Joseph Abbey due to
supposed safety and health concerns.178
The Fifth Circuit searched for a rational relationship between
Louisiana’s statutory scheme and the state’s goals of public health
and safety and consumer protection.179 Although the Louisiana law
was presumed constitutional, the Abbey successfully met its burden
and provided sufficient evidence to support the finding that the
legislation was arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional.180 St. Joseph
Abbey is distinguishable from Williamson, where the plaintiffs failed
to rebut every conceivable post hoc rationale of the regulation.181
Although the state presented legitimate purposes for the casket
regulations, the court properly found that the history of the Act and
the absence of other state regulations governing the construction and
design of caskets and out-of-state casket retailers diminished any
rational connection between Louisiana’s means and ends.182
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that there was
not a rational basis for Louisiana’s casket regulations.
B. Revitalization of Rationality
Amidst the Supreme Court’s numerous formulations of rational
basis review, the Fifth Circuit opinion revitalizes the rationality
standard by adding critical language to the framework established
in Carolene Products.183 In Williamson, the Supreme Court
initiated misconceptions of the judicial deference once given to
state economic legislation.184 The Supreme Court in Williamson
noted that “[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws,
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
177. Id. at 223–24.
178. Id. at 217–18 (finding that Louisiana law does not restrict casket
purchases in any way over the Internet or from other sources out of state).
179. Id. at 223–27.
180. Id. at 226–27.
181. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
182. Castille, 712 F.3d at 227.
183. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
184. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488.
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of thought.”185 The deferential approach in Williamson is
commonly misconstrued to provide an automatic validation of
legislation under rational basis review.186 The Fifth Circuit follows
the spirit of Williamson but makes a significant clarification: “The
great deference due state economic regulation does not demand
judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the context of
its adoption nor does it require courts to accept nonsensical
explanations for regulation.”187 Using the phrases “judicial blindness”
and “nonsensical explanations,” the Fifth Circuit implied that the
rational basis test is much more than a judicial rubber stamp or
mechanical test.188
Revitalizing the rationality standard of rational basis review,
the Fifth Circuit’s decision is a model example of proper due
process and equal protection analysis of state economic legislation.
The predominant requirements of the rational basis test are twofold, but the Fifth Circuit provided a more detailed framework.189
First, courts must identify a legitimate governmental purpose.190
Courts accept as legitimate all objectives within the state’s police
power, including public health, public safety, and general welfare
interests.191 Considering legitimate governmental objectives for the
law, courts may also consider post hoc rationales—meaning
conceivable rationales the state could have provided.192 Second,
courts must evaluate the relationship between the state’s chosen
means and the state’s articulated interests.193 Courts must consider
the context and history of the challenged legislation, because even
a post hoc rationale cannot be “fantasy.”194 Third, even if courts
find a rational basis between the regulation and a legitimate state
interest, they must look to the record to determine whether the
rational basis is refuted by the evidence presented by the

185. Id.
186. Saphire, supra note 30, at 605. One scholar noted that the “‘mere
rationality’ requirement symbolized virtual judicial abdication.” Id. at 607
(quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
19 (1972)).
187. Castille, 712 F.3d at 226.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 223–26.
190. Id. at 223.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 221.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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plaintiffs.195 Where every conceivable rationale is contradicted,
courts must invalidate the challenged law.196
The Fifth Circuit’s application of the rational basis standard
reflects Justice Field’s position in the pre-Lochner era.197 Justice
Field supported the right of every citizen to follow his calling but
maintained the importance of licensure requirements to ensure the
necessary qualifications of learning and skill for certain
professions.198 Justice Field exercised appropriate judicial restraint
yet protected economic liberties, observing these rights as the
“distinguishing feature of our republican institutions.”199 Moreover,
he acknowledged the deference required for state judgment but, like
the Fifth Circuit, did not stop there. Describing the constitutionality
of licensing requirements, Justice Field stated:
If they are appropriate to the calling or profession, and
attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to
their validity can be raised because of their stringency or
difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such
calling or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable
study and application, that they can operate to deprive one of
his right to pursue a lawful vocation.200
Justice Field and the Fifth Circuit demonstrated deference for
the judgments of state legislatures and an understanding of the
importance of occupational regulations; however, the Fifth Circuit
opinion transformed Justice Field’s nineteenth-century articulation
into accessible language for the twenty-first century. The opinion
injected meaning back into the vague reiterations of due process
analysis that drain the rational basis test of its only requirement: a
rational basis.201
Revitalizing the definitions previously formulated by courts,
the Fifth Circuit emphasized the significance of the rational basis
standard.202 Louisiana’s invalidated casket regulations reveal that
states are not always rational and, more importantly, do not always
win.203 Plaintiffs prevail when they present evidence that
195. Id. at 223.
196. Id. at 220.
197. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 109–11 (1872).
198. Id.
199. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1889).
200. Id. at 122.
201. Saphire, supra note 30, at 605.
202. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
203. Jeff Rowes & Scott Bullock, Divine Justice: IJ Case on Behalf of Monks
Puts Lid on Louisiana Casket Monopoly, INST. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 2011),
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deteriorates any logical connection between the challenged statutory
scheme and any plausible legitimate rationale.204 Although the
Fifth Circuit’s opinion is consistent with Supreme Court precedent
and constitutional principles, it is a reminder to all courts of two
basic ideals. First, the government does not prevail simply by
offering a general justification of public health, safety, or welfare.205
Instead, when the government articulates a legitimate interest, there
must be a factually plausible, logical connection between a
legitimate interest and the challenged law.206 Second, plaintiffs can
successfully negate plausible rationales for challenged legislation
through an analysis of the statutory scheme and relevant evidence.207
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
In the wake of Powers v. Harris, St. Joseph v. Abbey sends a
warning to state legislatures: “The great deference due state
economic regulation does not demand judicial blindness.”208 With
a history of legislation regulating butchers, casket makers, and
other professional industries, the Fifth Circuit’s message resonates
most in Louisiana.
A. A Warning to State Legislatures
The Supreme Court has not invalidated a single piece of
economic legislation on economic substantive due process grounds
since the 1930s;209 however, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in St.
Joseph Abbey is an indication that not all state regulations will
satisfy even “the outer-most limits of due process and equal
protection.”210 St. Joseph Abbey is an exceptional case where the
reality of the facts eliminated any potential rational connection
between the casket regulations and a legitimate state interest.211 The

https://www.ij.org/divine-justice-ij-case-on-behalf-of-monks-puts-lid-on-louisiana
-casket-monopoly-2, archived at https://perma.cc/F4EH-PVBM (explaining the
important precedential effect of the opinion in St. Joseph Abbey in Louisiana and
beyond regarding the vitality of economic laws).
204. See Castille, 712 F.3d at 223.
205. Id. at 226.
206. Id. at 226–27.
207. Id. at 222.
208. Id. at 226.
209. See supra Part I.C.
210. Castille, 712 F.3d at 227.
211. Robert Barnes, Louisiana Monks Go To Court To Sell Their Caskets,
WASH. POST (May 29, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/louisian a-
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president of the Institute for Justice, the Abbey’s representative,
articulated three critical components to a successful suit: “outrageous
facts,” “evil villains,” and “sympathetic clients.”212 Amidst the
increasing number of licensure requirements for various
professions, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion is a critical reminder to
state legislatures that the power to regulate is not limitless.213
Because courts following the Fifth Circuit’s opinion will not accept
“fantasy” or “nonsensical explanations,” state legislatures should
rethink future economic regulations, particularly those protectionist
measures disguised as rationalizations of consumer protection and
public health.214
Louisiana’s irrational licensure requirements and protectionist
motivations for regulating casket sales mimic the reality of
licensing schemes in many states. Current licensing statutes govern
an endless list of trades.215 Like Louisiana’s casket regulations,
most licensing statutes impose a series of requirements that must
be satisfied before granting entry into the profession.216 Masked as
public safety or health measures, many licensing schemes are
enacted to suppress competition.217 Licensing boards are normally
“composed of members of the regulated occupation, thereby
endowing established producers with the discretion to exclude their
own potential competitors.”218 Similarly, the Louisiana casket
regulations imposed extensive requirements on casket retailers
forcing them to become licensed funeral directors to sell caskets.219
Moreover, the nine-member State Board, the entity responsible for

monks-go-to-court-to-sell-their-caskets/2012/05/29/gJQA7VMK0U_story.html?hpi
d=z1, archived at http://perma.cc/L2EV-7C7R.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Castille, 712 F.3d at 223, 226.
215. See Raynor, supra note 142, at 1085. Licensing statues currently govern
various trades, including “taxidermists, elevator operators, auctioneers, florists,
fortune tellers, interior designers, junkyard dealers, motion picture projectionists,
hair braiders, upholsterers, ticket brokers, and turtle farmers.”
215. Id.
216. See Matt Davis, Comment, Licensing the Competition to Death: How
Economic Protectionism Would Allow the Louisiana Board of Embalmers and
Funeral Directors to Nail the Coffin Shut on the Monks of St. Joseph Abbey, 39
S.U. L. REV. 199, 202 (2011).
217. Id.
218. Raynor, supra note 142, at 1086.
219. Castille, 712 F.3d at 218. (“A funeral director must have a high school
diploma or GED, pass thirty credit hours at an accredited college, and complete
a one-time apprenticeship.”).
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enforcing the regulations, has only one representative who is not
affiliated with the funeral industry.220
Considering the relationship of Louisiana’s casket regulations
and licensing schemes more generally, the timing of the Fifth
Circuit’s decision is significant. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling is only
one of a handful of decisions since the New Deal to protect
economic liberty.221 As a result, the Fifth Circuit’s decision sets
critical precedent for future challenges of economic legislation.222
B. The Validity of Louisiana Licensure Requirements
The Supreme Court rejected the State Board’s petition for
review, so the Fifth Circuit’s ruling survives as vitally important
precedent for the protection of economic liberty.223 The opinion
serves as a platform to challenge other irrational licensing schemes.
Consequently, the decision will likely influence the construction of
future economic legislation and will have an equally profound effect
on current regulations in Louisiana.224 The Fifth Circuit’s decision
strays from previous Louisiana jurisprudence on the constitutionality
of professional licensure requirements.225 Louisiana district courts
have upheld many laws similar to Louisiana’s casket regulations.226
As a result of the Fifth Circuit’s holding, the validity of Louisiana’s
economic laws which once passed constitutional muster may now be
questioned.227
Louisiana is home to various licensure requirements governing a
wide range of professions.228 Like the casket regulations, these laws
suffered constitutional attack. In Meadows v. Odom, Louisiana’s
florist licensing requirements were challenged.229 The plaintiffs
included would-be florists who were unable to pass the highly
220. Id. at 219 (“By law, the nine-member State Board must consist of four
licensed funeral directors, four licensed embalmers, and just one representative
not affiliated with the funeral industry.”).
221. See supra Part I.C.
222. See Challenging Louisiana’s Casket Cartel, supra note 141.
223. Castille v. St. Joseph Abbey, 134 S. Ct. 423, 187 (2013) (denying the
petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit).
224. See supra note 223.
225. Id.
226. Rowes & Bullock, supra note 203.
227. See Challenging Louisiana’s Casket Cartel, supra note 141.
228. See Professional and Occupational Licenses, LOUISIANA.GOV, http://louis
iana.gov/Services/POLicenses/, archived at http://perma.cc/EBU4-UAYT (last
visited Jan. 12, 2015) (listing all of the professional and occupational licenses in
Louisiana).
229. Meadows v. Odom, 356 F. Supp. 2d 639, 640 (M.D. La. 2005).
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subjective state-mandated exam graded by existing florists.230
Following the Tenth Circuit’s logic in Powers, the district court
upheld the legislation and found that the floral licensing examination
was rationally related to a legitimate government interest in
regulating the profession.231 First, the court found that the licensure
qualifications had a rational connection with the applicants’ “fitness
or capacity to serve in that trade or profession.”232 Second, the court
concluded that the floral examination was rationally related to the
government interest of public welfare and safety.233 The court was
satisfied with the state’s proffered justification to ensure florist
arrangements were assembled properly in a manner least likely to
cause harm to consumers.234
Despite the district court’s decision in Meadows, the Louisiana
State Legislature repealed some of the most arbitrary and
subjective components of the licensing scheme;235 however, the
Meadows court would have likely ruled differently and eliminated
the arbitrary florist licensing requirements if it had the insight of
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in St. Joseph Abbey.236 The florist and
casket regulations are very similar in their lengthy examination
requirements and hefty penalties.237 Like the casket laws, the
florist requirements appeared to be purely protectionist
measures.238 Furthermore, the relationship between the imposed
qualifications and the public safety interests appear equally
attenuated.239 Applying the logic of the Fifth Circuit, the state’s
interest in protecting consumers from injuries would not be enough
to satisfy even the deferential rational basis test.240
In addition to the florist licensure requirements, Louisiana has
laws regulating various other occupations, such as hair braiding,
teeth whitening, and food truck vendors.241 Applying the Fifth
Circuit’s reasoning in St. Joseph Abbey, the validity of these
230. Id. at 640.
231. Id. at 643–44.
232. Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811, 823 (M.D. La. 2005) (quoting
Payne v. Fontenot, 925 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. La. 1995)), vacated as moot, 198 F.
App’x 348 (5th Cir. 2006).
233. Id. at 823–25.
234. Id.
235. Meadows v. Odom, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/meadows,
archived at http://perma.cc/JR4Z-KCH (last visited Dec. 26, 2014).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Meadows, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
239. Id.
240. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226 (5th Cir. 2013).
241. See generally Davis, supra note 216.
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licensing laws is questionable.242 For example, Louisiana is one
out of ten remaining states to have a specialized license for hair
braiders.243 Louisiana law requires 1,000 hours of training and
education to become a licensed hair braider.244 An artistic tradition
passed down from generation to generation, hair braiding—much
like making caskets and arranging flowers—is not an activity
deserving of such burdensome regulations.245 As a result, these
demanding licensing requirements appear solely to protect the
industry from competition, which standing alone is not enough
under the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning.246
The Fifth Circuit opinion is especially important in Louisiana,
where the very words of the Louisiana Constitution seem to have
been forgotten. The Preamble of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution
begins by stating: “We, the people of Louisiana, grateful to
Almighty God for the civil, political, economic, and religious
liberties we enjoy, and desiring to protect individual rights to life,
liberty, and property.”247 The preamble explicitly states that the
people of Louisiana enjoy economic liberties.248 Considering the
very language of the Louisiana Constitution, it is challenging to
reconcile the fact that the same state gave birth to some of the
nation’s most arbitrary laws, which regulate butchers and casket
makers. Nonetheless, the Louisiana Constitution supports the Fifth
Circuit’s determination that pure economic protectionism is not a
legitimate governmental interest;249 accepting such a proposition
would allow arbitrary interferences with individuals’ economic
liberties, rights enjoyed by Louisiana’s citizens.250
C. A Final Victory for the Monks
The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the State Board’s
petition for review is a final victory for the monks of St. Joseph
Abbey.251 The denial leaves for another day the Supreme Court’s
242. Castille, 712 F.3d at 226.
243. Valerie Bayham, A Dream Deferred, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij
.org/legal-barriers-to-african-hairbraiding-nationwide-2, archived at http://perma
.cc/25MN-G3WF (last visted Dec. 26, 2014).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Castille, 712 F.3d at 226.
247. LA. CONST. pmbl.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Heather Nolan, St. Joseph Abbey Monks Can Legally Sell Caskets After
U.S. Supreme Court Rejects State Funeral Directors Request for Hearing, THE
TIMES PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2013/10/st_joseph_abbey
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answer to the question this Note explores: whether pure economic
protectionism is a legitimate governmental interest.252 Plainly,
there is a conflict that must be resolved by the Supreme Court in the
future, and the State Board’s petition anticipates future challenges;253
surely a similar crowd of Louisiana-born entrepreneurs will return to
the Court’s steps. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision
provides the much-needed relief for the monks who will be able to
legally sell their handcrafted caskets free from the State Board’s
scrutiny.254 In addition, the monks’ success provides hope to other
entrepreneurs burdened by protectionist licensing requirements.255
Although a victory for the monks, the circuit split remains.256
Rejecting the State Board’s petition, the Supreme Court
simultaneously scrapped the opportunity to expressly reject the
contention that pure economic protectionism is a legitimate state
interest and establish the first instance since the 1930s where the
Court invalidated economic legislation on due process and equal
protection grounds.257 Until the Supreme Court speaks on the
issue, courts will struggle with whether to accept pure economic
protection of an industry as a sufficient rational basis for economic
regulation. Moreover, with the Tenth Circuit decision still intact,
states are better equipped to eliminate the labor of disguising
protectionist measures as legitimate public health and safety tools
and pass laws for the sole benefit of protecting one group at the
expense of another.258 The Tenth Circuit’s validation of pure
economic protectionism since 2004 produced a dangerous loophole
that allowed states to enact legislation that escapes the very
purpose of rational basis review.259 As states continue to pass
groundless laws unsupported by any public interest, the Supreme
Court will one day have to put the issue to rest once and for all.

_monks_can_sell.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FAC7-GEQQ (last visited Dec.
26, 2014).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Rowes & Bullock, supra note 203.
255. Id.
256. See supra Part II (explaining the circuit split between the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits).
257. See supra Part I.C (analyzing the decline in substantive due process).
258. Davis, supra note 216.
259. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the State Board’s
request to overturn the ruling in St. Joseph Abbey is a final victory
for the Benedictine monks and provides hope for the butchers,
bakers, and casket makers alike in their quest to make an honest
living. While the circuit split remains, the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in St. Joseph Abbey revives the protection of economic liberties
and defends against southern capitalists who have haunted the
economy since the Slaughter-House Cases.260 The rejection of
pure economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s deeply rooted safeguards
against arbitrary governmental interference.261 Moreover, the
decision is harmonious with constitutional principles and Supreme
Court jurisprudence aimed to protect the rights of citizens to
pursue a livelihood.262 The lawsuit’s attention did exactly what the
State Board adamantly fought against and more.263 Engulfed by the
courtroom spotlight, the monks reclaimed their right to sell caskets
in Louisiana and increased public demand for their handcrafted
work.264 Finally, the monks left their quiet lifestyle to fight for
their calling, ora et labora—“prayer and work.”265
Allison B. Kingsmill*

260. See supra Part I.A.
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262. Id.
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